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ABSTRACT
Cybersecurity enhancement of power systems has become one of
the main objectives of utility managers and regulatory agencies
because of the increasing number of cyberattacks against critical
infrastructures. In this paper, we investigate the application of
software-defined networking for improving the cyber-resilience
of power systems in the presence of cyberattacks using false tele-
control commands. It is first demonstrated that cyberattackers can
use false telecontrol commands to separate a power plant from
a power grid or trip a major transmission line. Next, it is shown
that software-defined networking can significantly enhance the
cyber-resilience of power systems in the presence of cyberattacks
using false telecontrol commands compared to legacy communi-
cation networks. This is because the source, destination and pro-
tocol of telecontrol commands can be examined and verified in
software-defined networking before communication packet for-
warding actions take place. Moreover, primary and back-up routes
of telecontrol commands can be pre-engineered in software-defined
networking to counteract potential cyberattacks.
CCS CONCEPTS
· Networks → Cyber-physical networks; · Security and pri-
vacy→ Malware and its mitigation; Distributed systems security; ·
Computing methodologies→Modeling and simulation.
KEYWORDS
Cyberphysical systems, telecontrol commands, software-defined
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1 INTRODUCTION
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems provide
operators ability to monitor and control power systems [1]. Legacy
SCADA systems rely on private communication networks without
remote access which minimizes the accessibility of cyber intruders
and diminishes potential cyber threats. Yet, the introduction of
standard and interoperable communication protocols like IEC 61850,
adoption of Internet of Things devices and cloud services as well as
connection of SCADA systems to corporate services and enterprise
networks are expected to compromise the cybersecurity of SCADA
systems [2, 3]. Thus, there is a pressing need for novel security
measures to enhance the cybersecurity of SCADA systems.
Cybersecurity of SCADA systems has received considerable at-
tention over the past decade in particular after the cyberattack
against a waste management system in Queensland [4] and cyber-
attacks against the Ukrainian power grid in 2015 and 2016 [5], [6].
A comprehensive literature survey of research works on SCADA
cybersecurity has been provided in [7]. A framework for cyber
vulnerability assessment of SCADA in power systems has been pro-
posed in [8, 9]. In [10], power system reliability has been evaluated
considering cyberattacks against SCADA systems.
Telecontrol is a critical function in SCADA systems which can
be exploited by cyberattackers to execute a wide range of attacks
against power systems including harmful network topology changes,
critical asset tripping or unwanted load shedding [11ś13]. Cyberat-
tacks using false telecontrol commands are detrimental to power
systems for several reasons. First, coordinated cyberattacks using
false telecontrol commands can cause significant impact in a short
period of time. Second, the sluggish nature of data collection by
SCADA systems prevents any potential corrective actions to thwart
damages caused by cyberattacks using false telecontrol commands.
This is because operators may become aware of the consequences
of such attacks only after damage occurrence [12]. Additionaly,
false data injection attacks can be used by cyberattackers against
SCADA data collection in harmony with false telecontrol command
injection attacks to hamper corrective actions by operators. Lastly,
detection and mitigation of cyberattacks which employs false tele-
control commands is difficult considering the existing systems and
practices since telecontrol commands lack authentication or other
security features [12].
The previous research works for enhancing the cybersecurity
of telecontrol commands have been focused on distributed secu-
rity solutions and intrusion detection systems. A semantic analysis
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framework based on a distributed network of intrusion detection
systems has been proposed in [11] to detect cyberattacks using
false telecontrol commands. This framework has been extended in
[12, 13] by considering a power flow analysis capable of estimating
the execution consequences of telecontrol commands. A distributed
security solution has been proposed in [14] which performs real-
time power system analysis to evaluate the impact of the control
commands before execution. The semantics of Generic Object Ori-
ented Substation Events (GOOSE) messages have been employed
in [15] to identify abnormal behaviors of GOOSE telecontrol com-
mands in the IEC 61850 compliant systems. This is while little or
no attention has been given to cyber-resilience of communication
networks involved in telecontrol functions.
As communication networks in substations move away from
copper wires toward Ethernet-based connections, it is crucial to
investigate the cyber-resilience of available Ethernet-based com-
munication network technologies due to stringent requirements of
automation and control functions like telecontrol functions in sub-
stations. The term Resilience is defined by the National Academics as
łthe ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more
successfully adapt to adverse eventsž [16]. In this paper, we use the
term cyber-resilience to refer to the ability of the communication
network to plan for and mitigate cyberattacks against telecontrol
commands. Software-defined networking is a programmable com-
munication technology that has received considerable attention
over the past few years for satisfying the scalability, reliability, and
ease of implementation demanded by automation and control func-
tions for power systems. D. Jin et al. investigates the self-healing
capabilities of SDN compared to legacy network in the context
of microgrid operation [17]. In [18], the authors investigated the
security of SDN infrastructure when applied to smart grids. In this
paper, we use the term cyber-resilience to refer to the ability of the
communication network to withstand and mitigate cyberattacks
against telecontrol commands.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• The development of a co-simulation-based platform for mod-
eling and implementation of SDN technologies in power grid
operational environments.
• The use of this platform for cyberattack simulation against
telecontrol commands and for the assessment of SDN cyber-
resilience.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the attack model. The basics of software-defined network-
ing are briefly discussed in Section III. A co-simulation environment
for cybersecurity analysis of telecontrol functions is described in
Section IV. Lastly, simulation results are provided in Section V
before providing concluding remarks in Section VI.
2 ATTACK MODEL
In this paper, we assume that cyberattackers have remote access to
the wide area network connecting a control center and substations
as illustrated in Fig. 1. Therefore, they are able to sniff and inject
telecontrol commands. The attackers are assumed to acquire the
required remote access either by using legitimate stolen operators
credentials or by recruiting an employee with legitimate access to






Figure 1: Cyberattacks using telecontrol commands.
After securing the initial network access, cyberattakers can take
advantage of the absence of encryption in SCADA communication
protocols to sniff packets containing substation information such as
measurements, telecontrol commands, and status of circuit breakers.
Moreover, they can obtain critical information about the network
topology and the substation critical assets to perform a high impact
attack.
In this work we consider that cyberattackers execute a False Data
Injection attack against telecontrol commands. In that scenario, the
attackers gain access to the wide area network and actively inject
false telecontrol commands toward substations to achieve their
objectives.
3 SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORKING
Software-defined networking is a paradigm shift in communica-
tion network management which decouples control plane from
data plane [19]. In legacy communication networks, data plane and
control plane are both integrated into network devices. As such,
network devices determine paths of communication packets using
distributed algorithms and protocols such as rapid spanning tree
protocol (RSTP). In contrast, paths of communication packets in
software-defined networking are centrally configured by applica-
tions in SDN application plane through SDN controller. One of the
benefits of this paradigm shift is that primary and back-up paths for
every communication packet can be pre-engineered considering
the source, destination and protocol of communication packets.
Communication networks in software-defined networking con-
sist of three planes including application plane, control plane and
data plane as illustrated in Fig. 2 [20]. The application plane is re-
sponsible for decision making about network resources/functions,
and communicates with the control plane using northbound appli-
cation programming interface (API). The control plane manages the
network devices in the data plane based on instructions received
from the application plane. The control plane communicates with
the data plane using southbound API. The OpenFlow protocol is
used by SDN controller to enforce forwarding rules to network
devices and collecting network statistics upon the application plane
requests.
OpenFlow employs three functions including matches, actions
and counters to control and monitor the data plane. When a com-
munication packet enters an OpenFlow-enabled switch, the switch
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Figure 2: Software-defined networking layers.
examines the header of the packet against match fields and based
on rule matches performs appropriate actions. Counters are used in
OpenFlow-enabled switches to maintain statistics on communica-
tion traffic. The match-action pair in software-defined networking
provides the capability to examine and verify different fields in
communication packets such as source, destination and protocol
before forwarding actions take place. This provides much more
advanced security control features compared to legacy commu-
nication networks. It is worth noting that the implementation of
defence strategies like MAC address filtering in legacy commu-
nication networks is an error-prone and arduous task because it
should be implemented manually for every single switch in the
communication network.
Network devices can be configured reactively or proactively
in software-defined networking. In the proactive case, network
devices are configured in advance by SDN controller and communi-
cation packets that do not match the rules in flow tables of network
devices are dropped. In contrast, SDN controller operates in re-
action to new communication traffic in the reactive case. In the
reactive case, communication packets that do not match the rules in
flow tables of network devices are sent to SDN controller. Network
applications then configure new rules for new packets in network
devices through SDN controller. The proactive approach eliminates
unnecessary delays introduced by communication between net-
work devices and SDN controller to manage new communication
packets and therefore is more suitable for applications in power
systems. Moreover, proactive approach is advantageous from cy-
bersecurity perspective since SDN controller can be removed after
pre-engineering the primary and back-up routes of communication
packets. Therefore, the single point of failure vulnerability of SDN
controller can be eliminated in the proactive case. SDN was orig-
inally designed to operate in reactive mode of operation since it
enables on-demand resource allocation and self adaptive configura-
tion. In general OT practices lean toward the use of static system
configurations that require less updates and can work in stand
alone mode for a long period unlike IT practices where updates
and interactions with the system operators are more frequent.
SDN switches operate based on a deny-by-default model in con-
trast to legacy switches that operate based on plug-and-play model
[21]. As such, communication packets that do not match flow tables
in SDN switches are dropped by default. Unmatched packets further
can be forwarded to intrusion detection systems for further investi-
gation. Moreover, SDN switches operate based on whitelisting of
communication packets. This is in contrast with legacy communica-
tion networks that operate based on blacklisting of communication
packets. An important benefit of whitelisting compared to black-
listing is that legitimate communication packets entering a wrong
port will be dropped. Therefore, cybersecurity controls can be im-
plemented to drop all communication packets that do not match
the pre-engineered traffic, ports and devices.
Testing and validation of cyber-resilience solutions like software-
defined networking for power systems is a difficult task due to the
complex interactions between cyber and physical elements as well
as unforeseen challenges that may occur during integration of
these solutions [22]. Pilot testbeds and emprical prototyping are
commonly used for this purpose. As such, we employ a co-simulator
based on OPAL-RT simulator and Riverbed Modeler to replicate
the cyber-physical interactions in a SDN-enabled power system.
4 A CO-SIMULATOR FOR CYBERSECURITY
ANALYSIS OF TELECONTROL COMMANDS
Co-simulation has received considerable attention in recent years
in particular for cyber-physical security analysis of power sys-
tems. This is mainly because of the rapid integration of communi-
cation and software components with physical devices in power
systems [23]. The existing co-simulators in the literature for con-
ducting cyber-physical security analysis can be classified into off-
line and real-time co-simulators. The main advantages of real-time
co-simulators are the ease of time synchronization, integration of
hardware in the co-simulation environment and scalability.
In this paper, we employ a real-time co-simulator based on OPAL-
RT simulator and Riverbed Modeler to investigate cyberattacks
against power systems using false telecontrol commands. More-
over, the co-simulator is employed to demonstrate the benefits of
software-defined networking for improving the cyber-resilience of
power systems compared to legacy communication networks.
OPAL-RT simulator is a real-time simulator which provides the
capability to simulate power systems. Moreover, we use OPAL-
RT to investigate the impact of a cyberattack against telecontrol
commands on power systems. This simulator interfaces with other
simulators or hardware through its input/output (I/O) modules
and Ethernet ports. Riverbed Modeler is a flexible communication
network simulator that models a variety of protocols, technologies
and network types and provides real-time simulation capabilities
through system-in-the-loop (SITL) feature. As illustrated in Fig. 3,
OPAL-RT simulator and Riverbed Modeler communicate using IEC
61850 data packets through network interface cards.
The data plane of software-defined networking is implemented
in Riverbed Modeler. The SDN controller is implemented using
OpenDayLight. It runs as a service in a Virtual Machine powered
by Oracle VM. The virtual machine connects to Riverbed Modeler
through an SITL "SDN Controller" illustrated Fig3 . The application
plane is implemented using Postman API. Postman is an application
that interact with HTTP API. In our case it communicates with
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Figure 3: Schematic representation of the co-simulator based onOPAL-RT simulator, RiverbedModeler andOpendaylight SDN
controller.
OpenDayLight using HTTP protocol and OpenDayLight communi-
cates with the data plane in Riverbed Modeler using OpenFlow pro-
tocol. Telecontrol command routes for our studies are programmed
in Postman and enforced to SDN switches in the data plane using
SDN controller in OpenDayLight. It is worth noting that Riverbed
modeler, Postman, and Opendaylight virtual machine are all run-
ning on a single machine, and only OPAL-RT runs on an external
machine.
5 SIMULATION RESULTS
Fig. 4 illustrates the IEEE power system relaying committee (PSRC)
D6 benchmark test system [24]. The test system connects a power
plantwith four generators to a 230 kV transmission network through
two parallel 500 kV transmission lines. The 230 kV transmission
system is modeled by an ideal voltage source. It is assumed that the
objective of cyberattackers is to disconnect the power plant from
the transmission system by tripping the circuit breakers CB10 and
CB11 through false telecontrol commands.
Two case studies are conducted here. In the first case study, the
station bus communication network of substation A is implemented
using legacy communication networks. In the second case study, the
station bus communication network of substation A is implemented
using software-defined networking. The assumption in the case
studies is that cyberattackers have access to the wide area network
between the control center and substation A.The standard IEC61850-
90-12 [25] states that WAN communication can be achieved using
routable GOOSE (R-GOOSE) based on UDP protocol, IP tunneling
which encapsulate GOOSE packets in an IP header and lastly layer-
2 GOOSE packets. In the case of layer 2 packets being sent over the
WAN, VLAN tagging is used to separate the local traffic (within a
substation) andWAN traffic (between substations/control center). In
this paper, we use GOOSEmessages for telecontrol commands in the


































Figure 4: IEEE PSRC D6 Test system.
WAN. Nevertheless, the same approach can be used for telecontrol
commands based on R-GOOSE without loss of generality.
5.1 Case Study I: False Telecontrol Command
Injection Attacks Against Power Systems ś
Legacy Communication Networks
In this case study, the station bus in substation A is implemented
in Riverbed Modeler based on legacy communication networks as
illustrated in Fig. 5. A tool named tcpreplay is employed in combi-
nation with wireshark to inject false telecontrol commands to the
wide area network in Riverbed Modeler. Wireshark tool is an open
source software which is able to monitor and save communica-
tion packets. First, the OPAL-RT simulator is employed to generate
GOOSE packets containing false telecontrol commands. Wireshark
is then employed to save the false telecontrol packets. In the case
studies, the destination MAC address of false telecontrol commands
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match the MAC address of circuit breakers CB10 and CB11. More-
over, GOOSE packets are used to send false telecontrol commands.
Yet, the source MAC address of false telecontrol commands is con-
sidered to be different from the MAC address of the control center.
It is worth noting that other scenarios such as sending telecontrol
commands with wrong destination address or wrong communica-
tion protocol as well as telecontrol commands from wrong ports
can be tested similarly using the co-simulator presented in this
paper. Nevertheless, these scenarios are not discussed in the paper
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Figure 5: Communication network between the control cen-
ter and IED in the substation A - station bus based on legacy
communication networks.








Figure 6: Status of circuit breakers CB10 and CB11 in Case
Study I.
The IEEE PSRC D6 test system is co-simulated using OPAL-RT
and Riverbed Modeler. The false telecontrol commands are first
generated using OPAL-RT simulator and saved using theWireshark
tool; Wireshark is an open-source software that is able to monitor,
and save communication packets. Tcpreplay command is used to
replay the false telecontrol commands using wireshark tool to the
riverbed modeler through the łattacker SITL Portž as illustrated in
Fig. 5.
As illustrated in Fig. 6, circuit breakers CB10 and CB11 are
opened at 𝑡 = 1 s by false telecontrol commands. Therefore, cy-
berattackers are able to successfully isolate the power plant from
the transmission system when station bus in substation A is based
on legacy communication networks. It is worth noting that Fig.
6 illustrates the change of the circuit breaker statuses in time as
observed by Substation A’s operator who is oblivious to communica-
tion latency on the wide-area network. Hence, the communications
latency is not represented in this figure.
5.2 Case Study II: False Telecontrol Command
Injection Attacks Against Power Systems ś
SDN Communication Networks
In this case study, the station bus in substation A is implemented in
Riverbed Modeler based on software-defined networking as illus-
trated in Fig. 7. At the beginning of the simulation, SDN switches
flow table must be initialized. For that purpose, an HTTP request is
sent from postman application to the virtual machine that runs the
Opendaylight controller. The HTTP request carries a XML body
that describes the name of the switch to be updated, the source
and destination MAC address of the packets of interest, the type
(GOOSE) and the port toward which the packets is to be forwarded.
This information is received at the controller level and then con-
verted to an Openflow packets that will be sent from the VM to
RiverbedModeler through SDN controller SITL port as illustrated in
Fig. 7. Upon packet receival the targeted switch will update its flow
table. It is worth noting that the proactive approach is considered
in this paper and SDN controller is disconnected from Riverbed
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Virtual machine: OpenDayLight (SDN Controller)
Postman API (Application Level)
Southbound interface Openflow protocol
HTTP requestNorthbound interface
Virtual Network Interface Card 1Virtual Network Interface Card 2
Figure 7: Communication network between the control cen-
ter and IED in the substation A - station bus based on
software-defined networking.
The IEEE PSRC test system is co-simulated again similar to Case
Study I and false telecontrol commands are injected into the wide
area network through a SITL port, i.e., attacker SITL port, using
the Wireshark tool. In this case study, false telecontrol commands
are dropped by SDN switches since the source MAC address of
false telecontrol commands did not match the forwarding rules in
SDN switches and therefore, the cyberattack was unsuccessful. As
MCPES’21, May 19ś21, 2021, Nashville, TN, USA Kemmeugne et al.






Figure 8: Status of circuit breakers CB10 and CB11 in Case
Study II.
illustrated in Fig. 8, circuit breakers CB10 and CB11 remain closed
in this case study.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper examined cyberattacks against power systems using
false telecontrol commands. Software-defined networking is then
proposed as a solution for enhancing cyber-resilience of power sys-
tems against false telecontrol commands. It is shown that software-
defined networking with whitelisting and deny-by-default features
can significantly enhance the cyber-resilience of power systems
against cyberattacks using false telecontrol commands. The find-
ings of the paper are tested and validated by a state of the art
co-simulator based on OPAL-RT simulator Riverbed Modeler and
opendaylight SDN controller. In our future work we will investigate
the scalability of SDN technologies in the context of WANs as well
as the SDN cybersecurity challenges for power grid applications.
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